Sustainability disclosure and financial analysts' accuracy: the European case by Ferrer Zubiate, Elena et al.
Sustainability disclosure in the European regulatory 
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Abstract 
Over the last few years, evidence has emerged of a positive interaction between 
sustainability and financial performance. The usefulness of sustainability disclosure 
mechanisms is a matter of controversy, however, due to their diversity and lack of 
comparability. These reasons motivated the enforcement of directive 2014/95/UE on 
sustainability disclosure. European countries therefore adjusted their local legal 
frameworks to this new regulation, which would enhance sustainability disclosure 
mechanisms and integration among stakeholders. Financial analysts, as requesters of 
sustainability reports, should produce more accurate forecasts as a result of these 
improvements.The aim of this study is to analyse whether the adoption of the directive 
has contributed to more truthful reporting to financial analysts in terms of risks and 
performance. The results show that EPS forecast accuracy has increased due to higher 
levels both of disclosure and reporting quality. 
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1.- INTRODUCTION 
Over the last few years, corporate sustainability has emerged as a new paradigm for value-
creation (Bansan & Song, 2017). This has resulted in new non-financial information 
disclosure requirements (COM 2011), particularly on social and environmental 
sustainability issues, with a view to identifying sustainability risks and increasing investor 
and consumer trust (RES 2013). Sustainability disclosure enables the measuring, 
monitoring and managing of the performance of long-term organizational  undertakings 
and their impact on society (RES 2013, p.I). These reasons have motivated the reform of 
the previous regulation on financial statements, under which non-financial disclosure 
requirements were low, particularly, with respect to sustainability (Directive 
2013/34/UE). With this aim in mind, the European Parliament called on the Commission 
to bring forward a legislative proposal on sustainability disclosure by organizational 
undertakings, which would allow more flexibility of action, in order to accommodate the 
multidimensional nature of corporate sustainability (Directive 2014/95/UE, note 3). The 
result of this action was the enforcement of directive 2014/95/EU of the European 
Parliament and of the Council of 22 October 2014 amending directive 2013/34/EU as 
regards sustainability disclosure and diversity information by certain large undertakings 
and groups. Investors and other stakeholders demand access to non-financial information 
on sustainability issues (Directive 2014/95/EU, note 12).Financial markets are therefore 
placing growing demands on businesses to commit to sustainable practices, which have 
actually been shown to improve financial performance (Cowton & Sandber, 2012; 
Gallego-Alvarez et al., 2018) and enhance corporate legitimacy (Criado et al, 2007, 
p.246). Companies are thus required to develop specific sustainability disclosure 
mechanisms for reporting their business practices to their stakeholders. 
Among the main users of information, including sustainability reports, are financial 
analysts, who use the information to prepare their forecasts and provide markets with 
recommendations and company coverage (Luo et al, 2015). Despite the increasing 
availability of information, its poor quality makes it hard for financial analysts to make 
accurate company assessments. The new directive is aimed at promoting sustainability 
disclosure, increasing reporting quality, and obtaining a more reliable picture of 
organizational politics, results and risks. The enforcement of this directive should 
improve analyst forecast accuracy, particularly because of the above-mentioned 
advantages relating to sustainability disclosure. The impact of sustainability disclosure 
on financial analysts’ forecast accuracy has been studied by various authors, such as 
Dhaliwal et al. (2012), Pascual et al. (2016), Muslu et al (2017) and Bernardi & Stark 
(2018b). However, these studies are based on findings for countries such as South Africa, 
China, Denmark, Malaysia, Brazil, Hong Kong, and India, where mandatory regulatory 
action, including laws, acts and regulations, has been taken. Directive 2014/95/EU is a 
different type of regulatory instrument with its own singularities. In general terms, a 
directive is “a legislative act that sets out a goal that all European member countries must 
achieve. However, it is up to the individual countries to devise their own laws on how to 
reach these goals” (European Commission, 2019). In the specific case of Directive 
2014/95/EU, the European member states had a two-year transposition period to reach 
the regulatory goal, which was to promote higher levels of comparability, flexibility and 
transparency to meet the informational needs of investors and other stakeholders on 
sustainability issues. This gives the directive a singularity and flexibility which place it 
somewhere between a soft-law regulation and a mandatory instrument. Despite the 
singularity of the directive 2014/95/EU as a regulatory instrument, its impact on analyst 
forecasts has not been evaluated in the European context since the end of the directive 
2014/95/EU transposition period in 2017.  
The aim of this study, therefore, is to analyse whether the adoption of this directive has 
contributed to promote more truthful reporting to financial analysts in terms of risks and 
performance, through higher levels of sustainability disclosure and better quality 
reporting. Such developments should simplify the company assessment process, and thus 
contribute towards higher analyst forecast accuracy. Our study will show whether the 
directive has resulted in better reporting quality than under the previous regime. We 
address this objective, by analysing a sample of European listed companies operating in 
countries subject to the directive, using earnings per share (EPS) forecasts as a proxy for 
improvement in the information provided to financial markets, over a period running from 
2008 to 2017. This choice of study period enables us to test the effectiveness of this 
regulatory instrument over time, and to discover that the information provided to financial 
markets, as measured by the EPS forecast accuracy, has increased in quality as a result of 
the directive. This study contributes to the existing literature in various ways. Firstly, it 
reveals that the enforcement of this directive enables a more accurate assessment of 
sustainability disclosure levels and increases the reliability of analysts’ forecasts. Thus, 
the directive is shown to be a flexible instrument with the capacity to bring about 
progressive change in financial analysts’ corporate sustainability assessments. The gap 
between academics and practitioners is also addressed by examining a specific field in 
the implementation of sustainability disclosure. In this respect, this study confirms the 
development of sustainable reporting standards as a valid instrument for improving the 
information provided to the financial markets. Finally, implications can also be drawn for 
regulators and law makers. The enforcement of a directive as a flexible regulatory 
mechanism significantly contributes to improving the quality of sustainability reporting 
by European companies. This mechanism presents some advantages over laws, acts and 
other mandatory regulatory actions that might be explored by regulators in other contexts. 
The remainder of this paper is structured as follows. The following section provides a 
review of the literature and presents our working hypotheses. Section three introduces the 
data, study variables, and research design for testing the proposed hypotheses. Section 
four presents the main findings, which are discussed in section five, and our final section 
provides some conclusions. 
 
2.- LITERATURE REVIEW AND HYPOTHESES DEVELOPMENT 
Several papers have evidenced a positive interaction between sustainability practices and 
economic performance (Margolis & Walsh, 2001; Orlitzky, Schmidt, & Rynes, 2003; 
Nieto & Fernández, 2004; Van Beurden & Gössling, 2008). This has awakened the 
interest of financial agents, who are increasing their demands for access to corporate 
information that will reveal the level of sustainability achieved by an organization. This 
demand can only be satisfied through transparency mechanisms such as sustainability 
disclosure (López-Arceiz et al, 2018). Bushman, Piotroski, & Smith (2004) and Gandía 
(2008) associate this term with the provision of accessible, complete and reliable 
information about sustainable (economic, governance, social and environmental) 
practices. 
Sustainability disclosure has thus emerged as an innovation to combat the criticisms and 
overcome the alleged limitations of corporate reports and render them more meaningful 
to users (Dumay et al., 2016; Abhayawansa et al, 2019, p.1615). As sophisticated users 
of corporate information, financial analysts employ specialized financial software and 
databases such as Reuters and Bloomberg, among others, to collect information about 
firms (Rowbottom & Lymer, 2009; Saleh & Roberts, 2017, p.60), which they use in their 
expert analysis of companies operating in financial markets. After obtaining and assessing 
financial and non-financial information about an organization, they make predictions 
about its future evolution (Nichols 1989; Schipper 1991; Bercel 1994; Walther 1997) 
which are then disclosed to financial markets as recommendations for buying, holding or 
selling shares and other financial instruments, and constitute a key factor in investors’ 
decision-making processes (Asquith et al., 2005; Barron et al., 2002; Palmon & Yezegel, 
2012). Thus, analysts play a mediating role between organizations and investors, whose 
main source of assessment information is the financial and non-financial information 
provided by the entities.  
Traditionally, financial analysts have assessed only financial reporting, tending to be 
wary of investments not aimed purely at profit maximization (Statman & Glushkov, 2009, 
p.34; Barnea& Rubin 2006, 2010). In recent years, however, they have begun to assess 
non-financial information relating to business organizations’ (environmental, social and 
governance) sustainability performances. Thus, there is recognition of the need for them 
to consider both types of information, in order to provide more accurate recommendations 
about companies that achieve a high level of corporate sustainability due to fuller 
disclosure. Directive 2014/95/EU has driven key reforms in terms of sustainability 
disclosure within the European context. It targets large undertakings which are public-
interest entities exceeding on their balance sheet dates the criterion of the average number 
of 500 employees during the financial year. According to this regulation, these entities 
shall include in the management report a non-financial statement containing information 
to the extent necessary for an understanding of the undertaking's development, 
performance, position and impact of its activity, relating to, as a minimum, 
environmental, social and employee matters, respect for human rights, anti-corruption 
and bribery matters. Moreover, as required by the directive, the Commission has 
published guidelines to help companies disclose relevant non-financial information 
(COM 2017/4234). 
Previous studies have focused on the capacity of the new regulation to improve 
sustainability disclosure levels. Loprevite et al (2018), for instance, compare the 
European case with respect to the volume of information disclosed before and after the 
regulatory reform, while ignoring the quality and its effects. Their conclusions show that 
the new regime has positive mid-term and irrelevant short-term effects on sustainability 
disclosure levels. Aureli et al (2018) analyse the transposition of Directive 2014/95/EU 
in the United Kingdom, France and Italy from a normative viewpoint, finding minimal 
uniformity of regimes and significant cross-country differences in sustainability 
disclosure practices. These studies offer a common conclusion; namely, improvement in 
terms of sustainability disclosure as a result of the enforcement of the directive. However, 
the quantity and quality of its impact on financial analysts’ forecast accuracy has not yet 
been analysed in this specific context. Our study addresses this gap in this research in 
terms of the limitations detected by Flores et al (2019).This regulatory instrument could 
have positive consequences for financial analysts’ activity, particularly because of its 
flexibility.  
Regulatory initiatives aimed in this direction have been introduced in other areas of the 
world, such as South Africa, China, Denmark, Malaysia, Brazil, Hong Kong, and India 
(Ioannou & Serafeim, 2017). However, they are based on mandatory regulatory 
instruments offering no measure of flexibility. There is controversy as to the impact of 
these new regulations on financial analysts’ accuracy in the areas mentioned. In South 
Africa, for instance, where reform of the local Corporate Governance Code has 
introduced sustainability disclosure as a necessary condition for market participation, 
Zhou, Simnett& Green (2017) find evidence of a negative association between 
sustainability disclosure and dispersion in earnings per share (EPS) forecasts, suggesting 
that this type of non-financial information is useful to financial analysts when assessing 
company performance. Similar results were obtained in this same context by Bernardi & 
Stark (2018b), Zhou et al (2017) and Lee & Yeo (2016), which might suggest 
sustainability disclosure through mandatory regulatory mechanisms as the better option. 
This same conclusion has been reached by Luque (2018) who evidence that the 
introduction of a mandatory regime in Denmark increased the number of reports and the 
quality of sustainable disclosure. However, other authors identify that mandatory 
regulatory instruments is of little help to financial analysts, since compulsory reports do 
not provide the degree of detail or use the type of format they require (Abhayawansa et 
al, 2019). Consequently, this type of regulation was not suitable to adequately report in 
terms of quantity and quality about sustainability aspects in those countries that adopted 
mandatory regimes prior to the directive. Mandatory sustainability disclosure, therefore, 
appears to be a double-edged sword, in the sense that it promotes sustainability disclosure, 
but limits the information provided to stakeholders, financial analysts included. In the 
EU, this limitation is overcome by using the directive as a progressive regulatory 
instrument with two-step compliance. Member countries first adopt the content of the 
directive and then transpose its content into national laws, thus enabling minimum 
harmonization and allowing sustainability disclosure to develop simultaneously but at 
different rates across all member states. This instrument, moreover, is a reference for 
other countries within the EU borders trying to orient their local regulations towards the 
content of the directive. Such flexibility would improve not only the quality of 
sustainability reporting but also the information disclosed to financial markets and the 
level of analyst forecast accuracy. To test this assertion, we propose the following 
working hypotheses, 
 
H1: The information provided to financial markets following enforcement of the 
directive improves significantly thanks to higher levels of sustainability disclosure. 
H2: The information provided to financial markets following enforcement of the 
directive improves significantly as a result of better-quality sustainability reporting. 
 
The non-rejection of H1 would indicate that the minimum content imposed by the 
directive is enough to improve the information provided to financial markets, as measured 
by the accuracy of EPS forecasts. Therefore, there would be no difference between this 
and traditional regulatory instruments based on laws and acts. Both would improve 
sustainability disclosure levels, thus enabling a full view of companies and their results. 
The non-rejection of H2, meanwhile, would reveal that the directive has also contributed 
to improving the quality of sustainability disclosure. The rejection of both hypotheses, on 
the other hand, would reveal that this regulatory instrument had failed to increase the 
information provided to financial markets. Should this be the case, the European 
authorities would need to promote other regulatory mechanisms, because minimum 
regulatory content would not be satisfying the information requirements of the financial 
markets and, more particularly, those of financial analysts. Figure 1 shows the proposed 
theoretical model. 
 





Our particular analysis focuses on an international sample of firms currently or previously 
listed on the stock exchange indexes of fifteen European countries (Austria, Belgium, 
Denmark, Finland, France, Germany, Italy, Luxemburg, Netherland, Norway, Portugal, 
the UK, Spain, Sweden and Switzerland1) all of which have adopted sustainability 
disclosure initiatives (Directives 2014/95/EU and 2013/34/EU for the EU countries and 
the Responsible Business Initiative for Switzerland). Our sample companies are all 
subject to this regulation due to their size as defined by the number of employees. 
                                                          
1 Bueno (2018) highlights that Switzerland’s standards incorporate the content of the European Directive 
despite non-membership of the European Union. 
The data for our analysis includes financial analysts’ earnings per share (EPS) forecasts 
from 2008 to 2017, which enables us to span the period of adoption of the directive, and 
thus consider both the transposition period and the enforcement of the directive in each 
country. The analyst activity data were retrieved from the database FACTSET2. 
Thus, the final sample is made up of 434 companies, 241 of which are classified as low- 
sustainability companies. The total number of observations is 4,710. Table 1 reports the 
number of firms and observations per country.  
 
INSERT TABLE 1  
 
3.2.- Main variables  
3.2.1. Dependent variables 
EPS forecasting accuracy, as a measure of financial analyst performance, is constructed 
from analyst consensus (median) EPS forecasts and annual EPS data, drawn, as already 
stated, from the FACTSET database. Mansi et al. (2011) define EPS forecasting accuracy 
as the negative absolute value of EPS forecasting errors calculated as the difference 
between actual EPS for fiscal year y and firm i, minus the median3consensus forecast for 
fiscal year y and firm i, scaled by the absolute value of the EPS consensus forecast. A 
coefficient of the analyst accuracy (ACC) index close to 0 indicates higher accuracy; the 
greater its difference from 0, the further it deviates from the consensus. The specification 
of this variable is given by expression [1]. 
ACCi, t, y = −1 ∗ abs �ActualEPSi,y−EPSi,t,y
Abs�EPSi,t,y�
�     [1] 




       [2] 
This variable allows us to monitor the increase in analyst accuracy due to the increase in 
sustainability disclosure brought about through implementation of the directive.  
3.2.2. Independent variables 
Carini et al (2018, p. 9) identify Directive 2014/95/EU as the starting point in the 
development of sustainability disclosure and describe its structure. We measure the 
enforcement of this ruling as a categorical variable (𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝑟𝑟14) denoting progress in the 
implementation of the directive, where a value of 0 indicates the pre-directive period 
(2008-2013), 1 indicates the transposition period (2014-2016) and 2 indicates the end of 
the transposition period (2017).This variable provides the basis for testing Hypothesis 1 
(H1). 
                                                          
2The reason for this choice of database is that it provides fuller coverage in Europe than the I/B/E/S, as 
noted by Balboa, et al. (2008). 
3To reduce the EPS skewness effect, we consider median rather than mean consensus. 
Hypothesis 2 (H2) states that the directive improves the quality of sustainability reporting. 
We test this assertion by splitting the firm sample into high and low sustainability 
reporters (Eccles et al., 2014; Nicolăescu et al., 2015; Leleux & Van Der Kaaij, 2019). 
Low sustainability reporters are firms where the quality of sustainability reporting was 
poor prior to the directive and high ones are those where it was already good. The data 
for this variable are from the RobecoSAM Sustainability Yearbook. According to the 
methodological document, released by RobecoSAM, this classification provides “an 
evaluation of the quality of a company’s reporting on environmental, social and 
governance issues” (RobecoSAM, 2019, p.7). Consequently, the dummy variable (RQ) 
takes the value 1 for the group of low sustainability reporters and 0 otherwise. 
Finally, in order to make our analysis more robust, we have also taken into account the 
implementation of GRI standards. This sustainability framework, being one of the key 
references on sustainability disclosure (Luque, 2018) is specifically mentioned by 
directive 2014/95/EU. We control for its effect by considering a dummy variable (GRI), 
which takes the value 1 if the company’s sustainability reporting in the pre-directive 
period did not comply with the GRI and 0, otherwise. The data for this variable was drawn 
from the Thomson Reuters ESG Scores database). We then classify the countries into 
three groups based on their transposition scores which appear in the report “Member State 
Implementation of Directive 2014/95/EU” (CSR Europe and GRI, 2017). This study uses 
nine transposition performance indicators4 which enable us to divide the member states 
into three groups. Those in the first group have gone beyond the directive’s requirements; 
those in the second have achieved full transposition; and those in the third only partial 
transposition. This enables the creation of a categorical variable (Env) that takes the value 
0 for countries that have performed beyond requirements (Denmark, Germany, Italy, 
Sweden, Austria), 1 for those that have performed strictly to requirements (Belgium, 
Finland, Luxembourg and Portugal) and 2 for those that have failed to transpose the 
original content of the directive (Spain, the United Kingdom, Netherlands, Norway and 
France). We include Switzerland in this last group. 
3.2.3. Control variables 
Since we also need to control for other, firm-level, characteristics potentially affecting 
analyst forecasting accuracy, all our model estimates include firm size (Size) as the natural 
logarithm of total assets at the end of the previous year. Lossebit is a dummy variable that 
takes the value 1 for firms with negative earnings and 0 otherwise. We also include asset 
tangibility (Tang), computed as the ratio of tangible assets to total assets; leverage (Lev), 
computed as the ratio of long-term liabilities to total liabilities; and Sales_Growth, 
estimated as sales in period t minus sales in period t-1, divided by sales in period t-1. To 
control for financial analyst factors, we also include Followt-1and Sigmat-1, to represent 
the number of forecasts used to compute the consensus and dispersion of the forecasts 
forming the consensus, respectively. We take into account the quality of account reporting 
                                                          
4 These nine indicators are: a) Definition of a large undertaking, b) Definition of a public interest entity, c) 
Report topics and content, d) Reporting framework, e) Disclosure format, f) Auditor's involvement, g) 
Noncompliance penalties, h) Safe harbour principle and i) Diversity reporting required. 
(Piot and Missonier-Piera, 2007; Kim et al., 2013), by estimating Big4, a variable which 
takes the value 1 if the company is audited by one of the big four auditing firms and 0 
otherwise5. The required data were drawn from the OSIRIS BvD database. Finally, we 
include the dummy variable Constituent, which takes the value 1 if the company was part 
of a constituent index in a specific year and 0, otherwise. The data for this variable were 
obtained from the Thomson Reuters (Datastream) database.  
 
3.3.- Research Design  
To detect a possible increase in EPS forecast accuracy after enforcement of the directive, 
we perform an analysis based on panel regressions specification, where the dependent 
variable is analyst accuracy for firm i, in industry j, and country k, at period t. The 
following are the specifications [3-6] for our set of hypotheses: 
 
H1: 
ACCijkt = α + β1Dir14 + ∑ βr+1Ctvarrijkt−1  + sr=1 δkt + φjt + γkj  + εijkt   [3] 
H2: 
ACCijkt = α + β1Dir14 + β2Dir14 ∗ RQ + ∑ βr+1Ctvarrijkt−1  + sr=1 δkt + φjt + γkj  + εijkt [4] 
Robustness:  
ACCijkt = α + β1Dir14 + β2Dir14 ∗ RQ + β3Dir14 ∗ RQ ∗ GRI + ∑ βr+1Ctvarrijkt−1  + sr=3 δkt + φjt +
 γkj  + εijkt          [5] 
ACCijkt = α + β1Dir14 + β2Dir14 ∗ Env ∗  RQ + β3Dir14 ∗ Env ∗  GRI + ∑ βr+1Ctvarrijkt−1  + sr=3 δkt +
φjt +  γkj  + εijkt          [6] 
 
where Dir14 is a variable that takes a value of 0 for the pre-directive period (2008-2013), 
1 for the transposition period (2014-2016) and 2 for the end of the transposition period 
(2017).; RQ indicates the level of sustainability reporting quality, and the term GRI 
represents the Global Reporting Initiative sustainability framework. The variable Env, 
which measures transposition performance, has three categories based on the stage 
reached in the transposition process. The moderating effect on accuracy is given by the 
interaction of the different variables with Dir14. All estimates include k control variables 
(Ctvarrijkt-1) potentially affecting analyst accuracy.These same models have been 
estimated using ∆ACCijktconsidering as the dependent variable to assess the increase in 
analyst forecasting accuracy resulting from the improvement in sustainability reporting 
following enforcement of the directive.  
In order to check for potential endogeneity, the firm-level control variables in all our 
estimates are lagged by one year to avoid simultaneity with analyst forecasting accuracy. 
Finally, the basic estimation includes various alternative combinations of specific effects: 
                                                          
5For France, the variable Big4 takes the value 1if the company is performing one of the two mandatory 
auditing processes.  
country-year (δkt), industry-year (φjt) and country-industry (γkj) fixed effects, which 
allow us to account for potential misspecification of the model and control for any shocks 
that might affect analyst accuracy and are not covered by our set of explanatory variables. 
Our basic results are obtained using an industry-year cluster to capture correlations 
between different firms in the same country across time. We therefore apply the more 
general framework used in Petersen (2009), which avoids the need for assumptions 
regarding the dependence structure of the standard errors by employing a simultaneous 
two-level (industry/year) clustering approach. The symbol εijkt is the white noise error 
term.The models were estimated using Stata v.16.0. 
 
4.-RESULTS 
Table 2 shows the descriptive statistics for the implementation of the directive (Dir14)in 
terms of accuracy and incremental accuracy, sustainability reporting quality (RQ), the 
sustainability framework (GRI)and progress in the transposition process (Env), including 
the mean, standard deviation and the results of an ANOVA test in all cases. 
 
INSERT TABLE 2 
 
The results show that the directive led to an increase in accuracy (ACC2008-2013: -0.229; 
ACC2014-2016: -0.198; ACC2016-2017: -0.149), although this effect is not consistent in terms 
of incremental accuracy (∆ACC2008-2013: -3.812; ∆ACC2014-2016: -2.791; ∆ACC2016-2017: -
3.020). It is also possible to observe a decrease in dispersion (ACC2008-2013: 0.373; 
ACC2016-2017: 0.257; ∆ACC2008-2013: 25.569; ∆ACC2016-2017: 11.593). This effect was 
intense for both high- and low-quality sustainability reporters (ACCLow_RQ 2008-2013: -
0.257; ACCLow_RQ 2016-2017: -0.181; ACCHigh_RQ 2016-2017: -0.195; ACCHigh_RQ2016-2017: -
0.109). Compliance with GRI standards has a progressive positive effect in terms of 
financial analyst accuracy, which is more pronounced in the case of companies whose 
sustainability reporting practices were of poor quality prior to the enforcement of the 
directive (ACCGRI 2008-2013: -0.265; ACCGRI 2016-2017: -0.138). Finally, progress in the 
transposition of the directive is also shown to have an impact on accuracy in companies 
with low sustainability reporting quality prior to the directive (ACCEnv1 2008-2013: -0.305; 
ACCEnv1 2016-2017: -0.140). A similar result can be observed for Env2 (ACCEnv2 2008-2013: -
0.250; ACCEnv2 2016-2017: -0.183). The ANOVA test also reveals differences in 
sustainability disclosure and levels of sustainability reporting quality due to enforcement 
of the directive. 
The information provided to financial markets, measured by EPS forecast accuracy, is 
expected to have improved as a result of the enforcement of the directive. Table 3 shows 
a comparative analysis of the directive adoption process (Dir14) including the estimates 
from model [3]. Columns (1) and (2) report the results for ACC and columns (3) and (4) 
those for ∆ACC.  
 
INSERT TABLE 3 
 
The above results show that the directive has had a positive and significant impact, as 
evidenced by a gradual improvement in financial analysts’ accuracy (ACC: 0.0424-
0.0471; p-value<0.01). However, this effect is not observed when incremental accuracy 
is considered (∆ACC: 0.8119-1.0481; p-value>0.10). We are also able to highlight that 
significantly lower accuracy is observed for companies with high levels of negative 
earnings (Lossebit:-0.2011-0.2018; p-value<0.01) and leverage (Leverage: -0.1788-
0.1787; p-value<0.01). While these two variables somewhat hinder the assessment 
process, Constituent Index Membership status can increase financial analyst forecast 
accuracy for a company (Constituent: 0.0844-0.0847; p-value<0.01). These results do not 
enable us to reject H1, because the additional information provided to financial markets 
after the enforcement of the directive is significantly improved by the higher levels of 
sustainability disclosure. 
However, the enforcement of the directive can also imply an improvement in terms of 
sustainability reporting quality. Descriptive statistics (RQ) have revealed considerable 
differences in analyst accuracy when this factor is considered. Table 4 shows the results 
from model [4], where columns (1) and (2) report the results for ACC and columns (3) 
and (4) those for ∆ACC. 
 
INSERT TABLE 4 
 
In all the reported estimates for ACC, we obtain negative and significant coefficients on 
the interaction terms between the 2014 directive and the level of sustainability reporting 
quality (ACC: -0.0206—0.0208; p-value<0.10). Despite the negative coefficients, the 
overall effect of the directive is positive, judging by the improvements observed during 
this period, which would enable financial analysts to provide more accurate forecasts for 
these companies. Thus, analysts appear to have improved the accuracy of their forecasts 
for companies with previously low levels of sustainability reporting quality, as evidenced 
by the increase in accuracy values with respect to the baseline across the entire sample. 
Nevertheless, the group of companies with low sustainability reporting quality levels 
continues to show lower accuracy than their high sustainability reporting counterparts. 
The results for the variable ∆ACC show a similar pattern, albeit without statistical 
significance. This result prevents us from rejecting hypothesis 2 (H2) because the 
information provided to financial markets after the enforcement of the directive improves 
significantly due to higher levels of sustainability reporting quality. 
Tables 5 and 6 show the results for the robustness analysis estimated by models [5] and 
[6]. Table 5 shows the results for the level of sustainability reporting quality based on 
GRI standards. Columns (1) to (3) show the results for ACC and columns (4) to (6) 
provide the results for ∆ACC. 
 
INSERT TABLE 5 
 
As can be observed in the above table, the directive has a positive and significant impact 
on analyst accuracy (ACC: 0.0493-0.0599; p-value<0.01). The interaction effect between 
the variable Dir14, sustainability reporting quality (RQ) and GRI standards is positive and 
significant (ACC: 0.1586-0.1632; p-value<0.10), showing that the adoption of GRI 
standards has encouraged these companies to improve their sustainability reporting 
quality, thereby enabling analysts to provide more accurate forecasts and demonstrating 
the effectiveness of the directive. The same finding emerges from the incremental 
accuracy (∆ACC) assessment, which reveals that this kind of standard has some potential 
as a reference for financial analysts (∆ACC: 2.0071-2.1653; p-value<0.10).This result is 
consistent with the findings for H2 regarding the ability of the directive to improve the 
quality of sustainability reporting. 
Finally, table 6 shows the results for the joint effect of the directive and the stage of 
transposition reached by each country. Columns (1) to (3) show the results for ACC and 
columns (4) to (6) provide those for ∆ACC. 
 
INSERT TABLE 6 
 
The impact of the directive is observed in an increase in analyst forecast accuracy during 
the post-directive period (2014-2017). The moderating effect of the stage reached in the 
transposition process (Dir14*Env) is significant (ACC: 0.0137-0.0187; p-value<0.05), 
suggesting that the degree of transposition plays a decisive role in explaining the increases 
in financial analyst forecast accuracy. Thus, the directive tolerates cross-country 
differences in the degree of implementation beyond the minimum required to improve the 
information provided to financial markets and EPS forecast accuracy levels. 
 
5.- CONCLUSIONS 
Sustainability disclosure has traditionally been a voluntary option for EU firms. Under 
the previous legal regime, private companies were left to decide their own level of 
implementation and disclosure of sustainable practices. However, although this proposal 
was consistent with the assumption of free will in modern economies, it was not enough 
to promote genuine sustainability commitment. The EU therefore promoted legislation 
compelling public companies to report their sustainability practices. This included 
various legal initiatives (Directives 2014/95/EU and 2013/34/EU for European Union 
countries and the Responsible Business Initiative for Switzerland).The results of this 
study reveal a further increase in the reporting of non-financial information as a result of 
the implementation of the directive. This positive effect operates through two channels; 
an improvement in terms of sustainability disclosure together with an increase in the 
quality of sustainability reporting; and GRI standards emerge as a useful reporting 
framework, especially in the opinion of financial analysts. Moreover, the directive allows 
cross-country differences in transposition rates as long as minimum content is met. 
The adoption of this regulatory framework has had key implications for financial analysts, 
who, as already stated, request increasingly higher levels of sustainability disclosure 
when making their forecasts, motivated by the observed positive correlation between 
financial performance and sustainable practices. The directive has enabled low-
sustainability reporting quality companies, whose results were difficult to forecast before 
the enforcement of the directive, to obtain more positive performance evaluations and has 
thereby encouraged them to develop sustainability reporting mechanisms. Despite the 
potential benefits in terms of forecast accuracy, however, sustainability reports are not 
widely accepted and considered by financial analysts (Krasodomska& Cho, 2017). This, 
therefore, is one of the key remaining challenges in this context. Finally, it is important 
to note that the enforcement of this directive is a further step towards Europe’s 
harmonization, having reduced regulatory disparity between member states and enabled 
an increase in the comparability and accuracy of financial analyst forecasts. 
This study provides practitioners with useful insights for financial decision-making. 
Thanks to the directive, analysts are able to make a more accurate assessment of firms’ 
sustainability performance, and thus produce more reliable forecasts. Another 
contribution of this research is to address the gap between academics and practitioners by 
examining a specific field of application in the development of sustainable practices. 
Although the positive interaction between sustainability and financial performance has 
already been analysed, this study examines the impact and its consequences for 
investment decisions in a specific context. The findings can also be applied by regulators 
and law makers. Thus, the implementation of this type of regulatory instrument, as well 
as having a positive effect on already sustainable companies, has a special capacity to 
convince formerly non-committed companies to practise sustainability reporting. 
Some limitations of this study must be acknowledged. The data used for the identification 
of sustainable companies refer only to listed companies, for whom the directive’s 
requirements were mandatory from the start. The results may therefore vary across 
samples and settings. Similarly, the effects of the directive require long-term analysis in 
order to contextualize its impact on accounting harmonization processes. Finally, the 
newly-emerging concepts of planetary and social boundaries are changing the perception 
of sustainability, and legal reform may be needed to adjust the law to the new reality. 
These limitations could be addressed in future research in order to gain further insights 
into sustainability disclosure.
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Variable % Total # Firms # Observations
High reporting quality 43.09% 187 2030
Low reporting quality 56.91% 247 2680
GRI 91.19% 396 4295
Env0 25.27% 110 1190
Austria 5.10% 22 240
Denmark 4.25% 20 200
Germany 6.16% 28 290
Italy 5.31% 22 250
Sweden 4.46% 20 210
Env1 17.20% 74 810
Belgium 4.88% 21 230
Finland 5.94% 28 280
Luxembourg 1.06% 2 50
Portugal 5.31% 22 250
Env2 57.54% 250 2710
France 8.70% 39 410
Netherlands 5.31% 22 250
Norway 8.07% 30 380
Spain 7.22% 32 340
Switzerland 3.40% 15 160
United Kingdom 24.84% 111 1170  
 
Table 2: Descriptive Statistics 
Accuracy Δaccuracy Accuracy Δaccuracy Accuracy Δaccuracy
Mean -0.229 -3.812 -0.198 -2.791 -0.149 -3.020
Std. dev 0.373 25.569 0.354 13.581 0.257 11.593
Mean -0.257 -4.038 -0.245 -3.334 -0.181 -2.793
Std. dev 0.394 29.470 0.404 16.433 0.300 9.696
Mean -0.265 -3.820 -0.229 -3.205 -0.138 2.671
Std. dev 0.397 27.734 0.396 15.481 0.233 9.453
Mean -0.113 -2.313 -0.353 0.813 -0.019 -0.040
Std. dev 0.196 13.764 0.524 0.181 - -
Mean -0.231 -3.818 -0.213 -2.132 -0.206 -2.891
Std. dev 0.358 31.927 0.353 7.465 0.341 8.827
Mean -0.305 -2.191 -0.168 -4.488 -0.140 -3.916
Std. dev 0.410 8.295 0.272 20.776 0.228 12.922
Mean -0.250 -4.876 -0.291 -3.517 -0.183 -2.289
Std. dev 0.401 33.379 0.462 17.882 0.301 8.724
Mean -0.195 -3.547 -0.139 -2.132 -0.109 -3.304
Std. dev 0.345 20.039 0.270 8.961 0.182 13.621
Mean -0.197 -3.615 -0.146 -2.105 -0.121 -3.841
Std. dev 0.346 20.987 0.283 9.163 0.199 15.170
Mean -0.137 -3.659 -0.031 -1.227 -0.028 -0.371
Std. dev 0.285 18.675 0.021 3.528 - -
Mean -0.149 -3.607 -0.149 -3.607 -0.104 -1.227
Std. dev 0.262 15.730 0.262 14.922 0.153 4.404
Mean -0.168 -7.012 -0.168 -1.540 -0.212 2.579
Std. dev 0.264 31.737 0.264 4.844 0.340 7.325
Mean -0.131 -3.517 -0.131 -1.628 -0.091 -4.428






























*** p-value<0.01; **p-value<0.05; *p-value<0.10 
Table 3: Directive 2014 and analyst accuracy 
ACC ACC ∆ACC ∆ACC
0.0424*** 0.0471*** 0.8119 1.0481
-4.45 -3.75 -1.39 -1.3
0.0069 0.0069 0.3077 0.3034
-0.32 -0.39 -0.46 -0.39
-0.2011*** -0.2018*** 0.3894 0.3904
(-7.08) (-10.15) -0.26 -0.32
-0.0548 -0.0572 -2.3361 -2.3829
(-1.17) (-1.34) (-1.20) (-1.27)
-0.1788*** -0.1787*** 1.0512 1.0606
(-3.08) (-3.39) -0.65 -0.42
0.0237 0.0236 0.5157 0.519
-0.65 -0.91 -0.26 -0.32
0.0016 0.001 0.9179 0.9019
-0.07 -0.07 -1.39 -1.02
0.0795 0.0801* -0.2391 -0.2259
-1.55 -1.9 (-0.19) (-0.11)
0.004 0.0024 -0.6925 -0.7371
-0.17 -0.1 (-1.21) (-0.81)
0.0844*** 0.0847*** 1.0394 1.0503
-4.79 -5.16 -0.81 -1.14
-0.3835*** -0.3806*** -5.9615 -5.8057
(-2.87) (-3.64) (-1.50) (-1.32)
Country –Year Yes Yes Yes Yes
Country –Industry Yes Yes Yes Yes
Industry - Year No Yes No No
Cluster  Industry-Year Yes No Yes Yes
R 2 0.1252 0.1259 0.0028 0.0029
Wald  Test (p-value) 0 0 0.3349 0.7227


















Table 4: Directive 2014, analyst accuracy and sustainability reporting quality 
ACC ACC ∆ACC ∆ACC
0.0538*** 0.0589*** 0.8354 1.0763
-5.03 -3.99 -1.53 -1.15
-0.0206* -0.0208* -0.041 -0.0492
(-1.62) (-1.52) (-0.08) (-0.06)
0.0037 0.0036 0.301 0.2952
-0.17 -0.2 -0.44 -0.37
-0.1997*** -0.2005*** 0.3957 0.3969
(-7.02) (-10.08) -0.26 -0.33
-0.0528 -0.0554 -2.3322 -2.3788
(-1.13) (-1.29) (-1.19) (-1.26)
-0.1781*** -0.1780*** 1.0535 1.0629
(-3.07) (-3.37) -0.65 -0.42
0.0254 0.0254 0.5238 0.5279
-0.7 -0.98 -0.26 -0.32
0.0019 0.0013 0.9189 0.9031
-0.08 -0.09 -1.39 -1.02
0.0771 0.0777* -0.2483 -0.2364
-1.5 -1.84 (-0.19) (-0.11)
0.0047 0.003 -0.6911 -0.7355
-0.2 -0.13 (-1.20) (-0.81)
0.0835*** 0.0839*** 1.0405 1.051
-4.76 -5.11 -0.81 -1.14
-0.3581*** -0.3546** -5.9062 -5.7385
(-2.67) (-3.35) (-1.40) (-1.26)
Country –Year Yes Yes Yes Yes
Country –Industry Yes Yes Yes Yes
Industry - Year No No No Yes
Cluster  Industry-Year Yes Yes Yes No
R 2 0.1255 0.1262 0.0028 0.0029
Wald  Test (p-value) 0 0 0.2666 0.7878
#Observations 3,430 3,430 3,429 3,429





















Table 5: Directive 2014, analyst accuracy, sustainability reporting quality and GRI 
ACC ACC ACC ∆ACC ∆ACC ∆ACC
0.0493*** 0.0554*** 0.0599*** 0.4588 0.7894 0.9512*
-3.28 -4.14 -4.08 -0.6 -1.31 -1.64
0.0065 -0.0019 -0.0095 0.5472 0.1542 -0.1329
-0.43 (-0.13) (-0.70) -0.72 -0.25 (-0.23)
0.1586* 0.1605* 0.1632* 2.0071* 2.0691* 2.1653*
-1.48 -1.5 -1.53 -1.58 -1.63 -1.7
0.0187 0.0179 0.0168 0.2281 0.2088 0.17
-0.81 -0.77 -0.73 -0.29 -0.27 -0.22
-0.2178*** -0.2178*** -0.2173*** 0.7461 0.7363 0.7451
(-5.99) (-5.98) (-5.95) -0.46 -0.46 -0.46
-0.0836 -0.0833 -0.083 -1.4996 -1.4934 -1.4919
(-1.27) (-1.27) (-1.26) (-0.67) (-0.67) (-0.66)
-0.1781** -0.1782** -0.1785** 1.0196 1.0316 1.0223
(-2.48) (-2.48) (-2.49) -0.6 -0.6 -0.59
0.0447 0.0449 0.0454 2.2522 2.2577 2.2786
-0.9 -0.91 -0.92 -0.98 -0.98 -0.99
-0.011 -0.0109 -0.0108 1.3943 1.4001 1.4067
(-0.31) (-0.31) (-0.31) -1.39 -1.39 -1.4
-0.0336 -0.0348 -0.0347 0.5947 0.5018 0.4446
(-0.44) (-0.46) (-0.46) -0.31 -0.26 -0.23
0.0101 0.0098 0.0095 -0.7567 -0.775 -0.7838
-0.4 -0.38 -0.37 (-1.18) (-1.19) (-1.21)
0.08739*** 0.0870*** 0.0869*** 1.5144 1.4989 1.4878
-3.54 -3.53 -3.51 -0.83 -0.82 -0.82
-0.3179** -0.3097** -0.3010** -7.5416 -7.2562 -6.8789
(-2.38) (-2.30) (-2.22) (-1.49) (-1.40) (-1.35)
Country –Year Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Country –Industry Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Industry - Year No No No No No No
Cluster  Industry-Year Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
R 2 0.121 0.1214 0.121 0.0041 0.0041 0.0041
Wald  Test (p-value) 0 0 0 0.3115 0.2449 0.2002
#Observations 2,215 2,215 2,215 2,215 2,215 2,215




















Table 6: Directive 2014, analyst accuracy, sustainability reporting quality, GRI and countries 
ACC ACC ACC ∆ACC ∆ACC ∆ACC
0.0137** 0.0181** 0.0187** 0.399 0.3893 0.3079
-2.09 -2.52 -2.05 -1.14 -1.13 -0.83
-0.0092 0.0036 0.0206 -0.3214
(-1.06) -0.35 -0.06 (-0.57)
0.0215* 0.9343***
-1.86 -2.88
0.0084 0.0068 0.0169 0.268 0.2906 0.078
-0.39 -0.31 -0.73 -0.42 -0.43 -0.1
-0.2024*** -0.2016*** -0.2186*** 0.3486 0.3519 0.7345
(-7.14) (-7.10) (-5.96) -0.23 -0.23 -0.45
-0.057 -0.0549 -0.0875 -2.367 -2.3692 -1.5194
(-1.21) (-1.17) (-1.35) (-1.22) (-1.20) (-0.66)
-0.1808*** -0.1811*** -0.1780** 1.0318 1.0341 1.1157
(-3.11) (-3.11) (-2.47) -0.64 -0.63 -0.65
0.0141 0.0148 0.0303 0.3301 0.331 1.9534
-0.38 -0.41 -0.61 -0.17 -0.17 -0.86
0.0017 0.0016 -0.0125 0.9138 0.9136 1.3687
-0.07 -0.06 (-0.35) -1.39 -1.39 -1.35
0.0652 0.0639 -0.0488 -0.3573 -0.3568 0.3844
-1.26 -1.24 (-0.63) (-0.28) (-0.27) -0.21
-0.0013 -0.0005 0.003 -0.7572 -0.7589 -0.8424
(-0.05) (-0.02) -0.12 (-1.30) (-1.29) (-1.22)
0.0858*** 0.0849*** 0.0913*** 1.1038 1.1088 1.518
-4.89 -4.84 -3.59 -0.86 -0.86 -0.79
-0.3674*** -0.3552*** -0.2743** -5.4444 -5.4805 -5.9405
(-2.71) (-2.65) (-2.03) (-1.41) (-1.37) (-1.17)
Country –Year Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Country –Industry Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Industry - Year No No No No No No
Cluster  Industry-Year Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
R 2 0.1222 0.1229 0.1149 0.0027 0.0027 0.0036
Wald  Test (p-value) 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.1935 0.0758 0.0000
#Observations 3,430 3,430 2,215 3,429 3,429 2,215















*** p-value<0.01; **p-value<0.05; *p-value<0.10 
 
 
 
